Xtract ze files

#305221 (131/135) ↑Funny ↓Awful πOld
<sdmkun> tar -xzf merc.tgz what the fuck
<sdmkun> how the fuck do you people remember this shit
<bucketmouse> just think with a german accent
<bucketmouse> XTRACT ZE FILES


Pyrit now in Ubuntu Linux

Pyrit had found it’s way into Debian 6 in February and had been mirrored into the recently released Ubuntu 11. You can install Pyrit in Ubuntu with “apt-get install pyrit“.

Using the new CCMP-attack in Pyrit

The last post described some of the background details of how the new CCMP-attack works. Using this feature in Pyrit is quite easy:

As the Temporal Key is not used during the authentication but only in the following data-stream, Pyrit needs more than just the fourway-handshake. The ‘analyze‘-command from now on indicates if an encrypted packet can be associated with an authentication and sufficiently constrained to actually “belong” to this authentication (encrypted with the Temporal Key from that authentication). A simply asterisk shows that:

>pyrit -r wpa2psk-linksys.dump.gz analyze
Pyrit 0.4.1-dev (svn r304) (C) 2008-2011 Lukas Lueg http://pyrit.googlecode.com
This code is distributed under the GNU General Public License v3+

Parsing file ‘wpa2psk-linksys.dump.gz’ (1/1)…
Parsed 499 packets (499 802.11-packets), got 1 AP(s)

#1: AccessPoint 00:0b:86:c2:a4:85 (‘linksys’):
#1: Station 00:13:ce:55:98:ef, 3 handshake(s):
#1: HMAC_SHA1_AES, good*, spread 1
#2: HMAC_SHA1_AES, good*, spread 1
#3: HMAC_SHA1_AES, good*, spread 1

All “attack“-commands from now on understand the new switch “–aes“. This switch tells Pyrit to attack an authentication using the new CCMP-approach if possible. You can, in fact, apply this switch all the time. Pyrit will figure out if the CCMP-path is actually possible. The switch will be removed (or reversed) in the future.

>pyrit -r wpa2psk-linksys.dump.gz -i dict.gz –aes attack_passthrough
Pyrit 0.4.1-dev (svn r304) (C) 2008-2011 Lukas Lueg http://pyrit.googlecode.com
This code is distributed under the GNU General Public License v3+

Parsing file ‘wpa2psk-linksys.dump.gz’ (1/1)…
Parsed 499 packets (499 802.11-packets), got 1 AP(s)

Picked AccessPoint 00:0b:86:c2:a4:85 (‘linksys’) automatically.
Tried 4094 PMKs so far; 1049 PMKs per second.

The password is ‘dictionary’.

Pyrit can use the new AES-NI instruction-set found in recent processors (e.g. Intel Sandy Bridge) to boost performance. The “list-cores“-command shows if the local processor supports this instruction-set:

> pyrit list_cores
Pyrit 0.4.1-dev (svn r304) (C) 2008-2011 Lukas Lueg http://pyrit.googlecode.com
This code is distributed under the GNU General Public License v3+

The following cores seem available…
#1:  ‘CPU-Core (SSE2/AES)’
#2:  ‘CPU-Core (SSE2/AES)’
#3:  ‘CPU-Core (SSE2/AES)’
#4:  ‘CPU-Core (SSE2/AES)’

Note that a recent version of GCC 4.4+ is required to compile the intrinsics for the new AES-NI instructions. Pyrit‘s module will not be able to use the hardware-based AES-acceleration if it was compiled with a previous version of GCC.

Please also note that this feature is currently only the the svn-codebase and not found in a released stable version. Your help is required to make this process faster. Please submit cases where Pyrit is able to successfully attack a handshake using the original approach but fails to do so when the –aes switch is applied. Such regressions need to be sorted out before we can make the new CCMP-approach a default and get a new stable version 0.4.1 out onto the road. Please open a bug on Pyrit’s bugtracker for these cases (including all necessary information).

Known-plaintext attack against CCMP

A new feature now completely implemented in Pyrit can boost the performance of database-driven attacks against WPA2-PSK by about fifty percent. As far as I know, Pyrit is the first and only tool that implements this new approach of attacking WPA2-PSK.

The idea, originally pitched to me by Domonkos Tomcsányi, is to leverage the knowledge of the plaintext for the first few bytes of an encrypted packet to find the correct Temporal Key. This is the key which is used by WPA2 in conjunction with CCMP and AES to encrypt and authenticate the data-stream. The performance-gain comes from the fact that computing the Temporal Key and one encryption-round via AES to prove it’s validity is faster than the classic approach of computing the Key Confirmation Key and HMACSHA1 over one entire packet.

The first important insight is that we know what the first six bytes of an encrypted message should be as there is always a LLC– and a SNAP-header. There is only a minuscule chance that a guessed key was incorrect after we try a possible CCMP-key and the first six bytes of the decrypted plaintext turn out to read AAAA03000000. After the Temporal Key has been computed, this check can be done with just one AES key-setup and one encryption-round.

The Temporal Key is a part of the Pairwise Transient Key which in turn is derived from the Pairwise Master Key using PRF-384. Technically spoken, PRF-384 is HMACSHA1 computed over the Pairwise Key Expansion and keyed by the Pairwise Master Key. As the function’s output is always 20 bytes per iteration (the length of a SHA1-digest) and the Temporal Key is 32 bytes into the function’s stream, we need the last eight bytes of the second and the first eight bytes of the third iteration. At first sight this makes it actually more difficult to compute the Temporal Key compared to the Key Confirmation Key which only requires one iteration of PRF-384. While implementing Domonkos’ idea I came to realize that there are two important (and afaik not previously discussed) weaknesses in the design of PRF-384 that we can exploit in order to lessen this disadvantage:

The PRF-384 function is – in essence – like a stream-cipher that produces a large number of output bits using a smaller number of secret input bits. Real stream-ciphers or strong PRNG feed the output of iteration N back as an input to iteration N+1; this makes it impossible to compute the state of the algorithm at iteration N without knowing it’s state at iteration N-1. However, PRF-384 does not do that: We can compute the second iteration (for the first eight bytes of the Temporal Key) without having to compute the first iteration. Second, the counter used in every iteration is placed at the end of the Pairwise Key Expansion instead of the beginning. We can therefor re-use the state of the SHA1-algorithm between iteration two and three as the HMAC-key and the first block of the message are the same.

Combining these two completely unnecessary weaknesses allows us to reduce the number of SHA1-rounds required to compute the Temporal Key from fifteen to seven. This is still more than the five rounds of SHA1 required to compute the Key Confirmation Key but in fact is more than fast enough: The one key-setup plus one AES-round required to confirm the Temporal Key can be done much faster than the four to six rounds of SHA1 required to check the Key Confirmation Key. This is especially true as we can utilize hardware-based implementations of AES with the new AES-NI instruction-set found in recent processors.

Putting this all together, the number of passwords Pyrit can check on my Intel i7 4×3.4Ghz increases from 5.4 million to 7.9 million per second, a straight 50% increase. I will post more details about how to use this new feature in the next blog-entry.

Teach your kids to count correctly

Teach your kids to count from zero, not from one. It will make their lives easier in a computerized world.

Incompatible change

The next svn-commit will drop support for Pyrit’s original database format used until version 0.2.3. You will not be able to use databases created with version 0.2.2 or a svn-version of around july 2009 or before.

I will also drop support for VIA Padlock as the performance provided by Padlock is now completely dwarfed by recent SSE2-compatible processors; also my only machine running a compatible processor broke down around one year ago, the code is unchecked since then. It was fun to implement, especially because Pyrit uses a simple memory mapping hack to get twice the performance out of the processor compared to what the hardware specification would allow.

Pyrit 0.4.0 released

I’ve finally kicked Pyrit 0.4.0 out of the door. You can find the new version here. The main changes compared to 0.3.0 are:

  • Added the CAL++-plugin for ATI (tarball is packed by hazeman and will be available soon)
  • Added command ‘check_db’
  • Complete rework of packet-parsing and handshake detection
  • Make default workunit-size configureable (workunit_size)
  • Make maximum number of used CPUs configurable (limit_ncpus)
  • Use GPU-native bitwise rotation with OpenCL if possible
  • Use libpcap to access capture-devices/files
  • CUDA-plugin now compatible with Fermi-GPUs
  • OpenCL-plugin now builds on MacOS 10.6
  • Fixed CUDA-plugin on MacOS 10.6
  • Fixed SSE2-detection on old CPUs
  • Fixed database-indices
  • Fixed rare IndexError in EAPOLCracker


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